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NOTES
THE PROBLEM OF COUNTING TO THREE UNDER THE ARMED
CAREER CRIMINAL ACT
The Armed Career Criminal Act provides sentence en-
hancement for those who have been convicted of three felonies.
Confusion has arisen as to the sequence in which these convic-
tions must take place in relation to the acts that gave rise to
the convictions. The author proposes that each of the three pre-
vious convictions be required to precede the commission of the
next offense.
INTRODUCTION
EVEN THOUGH MOST people can define "conviction" andfirst grade children can count to three, the combination of these
skills has persistently eluded learned federal appellate court
judges when attempting to interpret the Armed Career Criminal
Act of 1984 ("ACCA"). 1 The ACCA is a federal sentence en-
1. Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1802, 98 Stat. 2185. After being amended in 1986, the
ACCA provided:
In the case of a person who violates section 922(g) of this title and has three
previous convictions by any court referred to in section 922(g)(I) of this title for
a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both, such person shall be fined not
more than $25,000 and imprisoned not less than fifteen years, and, notwithstand-
ing any other provision of law, the court shall not suspend the sentence of, or
grant a probationary sentence to, such person with respect to the conviction
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hancement statute2 that applies to any person who, having the
requisite number of past felony convictions, is subsequently ar-
rested and convicted of possessing a firearm.' Under the ACCA, a
under section 922(g), and such person shall not be eligible for parole with re-
spect to the sentence imposed under this subsection.
Id. as amended by Pub. L. 99-570, § 1402(a), 100 Stat. 3207-39 (1986) (current version at
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (1988)).
2. Courts consistently have ruled that the ACCA is a sentence enhancement statute
because it increases the punishment of those convicted for other crimes rather than estab-
lishing elements of an independent federal offense. See, e.g., United States v. Rumney, 867
F.2d 714, 718 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 908 (1989); United States v. Affleck, 861
F.2d 97, 99 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1058 (1989); United States v. West,
826 F.2d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Jackson, 824 F.2d 21, 24 (D.C. Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1013 (1988); United States v. Hawkins, 811 F.2d 210, 220
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 833 (1987); see also Note, The Armed Career Criminal
Act Amendment: A Federal Sentence Enhancement Provision, 12 GEo. MASON L. REV. 99,
116 (1990) (arguing that the ACCA is a sentence enhancement statute). It is important to
determine whether the ACCA is a sentence enhancement statute:
If the ACCA constitutes a separate offense and this offense has not been set
forth in the indictment, the due process rights of the defendant have been vio-
lated. Furthermore, if the ACCA creates a separate federal offense, the govern-
ment [would carry] the burden of proving each element of that offense, and
failure to comply with this procedure [would] preclude[] use of the ACCA to
impose the greater sentence.
If the [ACCA] is [a] penalty enhancement [statute], however, the defend-
ant only need be tried for the present crime or crimes, and the jury need not
decide whether requirements of the ACCA have been satisfied. [Also], if the
ACCA is a sentence enhancement statute, the government is not required to
prove the defendant's prior convictions beyond a reasonable doubt [and] issues
of indictment and proof are not implicated.
Note, The Armed Career Criminal Act: Sentence Enhancement Statute or New Offense?,
56 FORDHAM L. REv. 1085, 1087-88 (1988) (footnotes omitted).
3. Possession of a firearm by a convicted felon is a federal criminal offense. See 18
U.S.C. § 922(g) (1988). This section provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person-
(1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprison-
ment for a term exceeding one year;
(2) who is a fugitive from justice;
(3) who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance (as
defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802));
(4) who has been adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been com-
mitted to a mental institution;
(5) who, being an alien, is illegally or unlawfully in the United States;
(6) who has been discharged from the Armed Forces under dishonorable
conditions; or
(7) who, having been a citizen of the United States, has renounced his
citizenship;
to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting
commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition
which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.
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person convicted of firearm possession who has three previous con-
victions for violent felonies or serious drug felonies will be fined no
more than $25,000 and imprisoned for a minimum of fifteen
years.4 The fifteen-year sentence is a mandatory minimum 5 with
no possibility of parole.6 Furthermore, the presiding judge can
neither suspend the sentence nor grant a probationary sentence in
regard to the penalty imposed for the possession offense.7
Thus, one who has three prior violent or serious drug felony
convictions and then commits an armed robbery can be prosecuted
for the robbery as well as for possession of a handgun by a con-
victed felon." In addition to the sentences on these two offenses,
the government can request an enhanced sentence of at least fif-
teen years imprisonment for the firearm possession offense pursu-
ant to the ACCA.9
The ACCA has raised a number of legal issues, many of
which are constitutional in nature.10 This note, however, focuses
4. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (1988).
5. See id. However, the ACCA does not expressly provide a maximum sentence,
leaving the matter to judicial discretion. Id.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1988).
9. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (1988). The ACCA also allows the imposition of a
fine up to $25,000. Id.
10. This note does not examine the constitutional controversies surrounding the
ACCA. In general, though, the ACCA has spawned the following constitutional issues and
subsequent judicial determinations. First, courts have determined that the absence of a
maximum imprisonment term is not unconstitutionally vague. See, e.g., United States v.
Blannon, 836 F.2d 843, 844-45 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1010 (1988); United
States v. Davis, 801 F.2d 754, 756-57 (5th Cir. 1986) (rejecting argument that sentencing
statutes are unconstitutionally vague for not setting a maximum sentence). Second, courts
have ruled that the ACCA does not impose cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
the eighth amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Pedigo, 879 F.2d 1315, 1320 (6th Cir.
1989); United States v. Rush, 840 F.2d 580, 582 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1238
(1988); United States v. Gourley, 835 F.2d 249, 252-53 (10th Cir. 1987) (life sentence
under the ACCA does not violate the eighth amendment when defendant has eleven prior
felony convictions, more than half of which involve firearms), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1010
(1988). Third, courts have held that the ACCA does not violate the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment, see United States v. Hawkins, 811 F.2d 210, 217 (3d Cir.)
(the equal protection clause is not violated by the application of the ACCA), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 833 (1987), nor is it an ex post facto law. See United States v. Greene, 810 F.2d
999, 1000 (11th Cir. 1986), post-conviction proceeding, 880 F.2d 1299 (11th Cir.), reh'g
denied, 888 F.2d 1398 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1322 (1990). A fourth
issue is whether the ACCA violates the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.
It has been consistently held, however, that punishing recidivism does not violate the
double jeopardy provision. See, e.g., Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 732 (1948); United
States v. Schell, 692 F.2d 672, 676 (10th Cir. 1982).
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on the controversy surrounding the interpretation of the "three
previous convictions" requirement." Part I of this note discusses
how various courts have defined "three previous convictions"
under the ACCA. 12 The currently dominant approach, which this
note labels the "criminal episodes approach," requires only that
the three previous convictions be based on "distinct" criminal epi-
sodes, regardless of intervening adjudication. In other words, a
single previous trial that results in three convictions based on
three separate occurrences of criminality is sufficient to trigger the
ACCA.13
Part II describes an alternative method of determining three
previous convictions, 4 the "intervening convictions approach," in-
troduced by the Third Circuit in United States v Balascsak"5 fol-
lowing a 1988 congressional amendment to the ACCA.'8 The in-
tervening convictions approach holds that "each conviction must
precede the commission of the next crime for which conviction can
be considered."' 1 7
Part III argues that application of statutory construction
rules and examination of the ACCA's legislative history supports
adoption of the intervening convictions approach.' Part III fur-
ther argues that policy considerations dictate that Congress
amend the ACCA by codifying the intervening convictions ap-
proach articulated in Balascsak.19 Specifically, the intervening
convictions approach protects congressional intent, provides in-
creased accuracy in the identification of career criminals, and is
II. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(I) (1988).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 20-40. Indeed, recently it has been argued
that the three previous convictions requirement applies:
to a person who is convicted of a violent felony, sentenced and incarcerated; who
then is released from prison, commits a second violent felony and in a separate
proceeding is again sentenced and incarcerated, presumably for a longer period
of time; is released, and who then commits a third violent felony.
United States v. Lane, No. 89CR0156, slip op. at 4 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 7, 1989).
13. See, e.g., Rush, 840 F.2d at 581.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 44-73.
15. 873 F.2d 673 (3d Cir. 1989) (en banc), affd, 902 F.2d 1558 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, IlII S. Ct. 173 (1990).
16. See infra text accompanying notes 41-43.
17. Balascsak, 873 F.2d at 685 (Greenberg, J., dissenting). The Balascsak plurality
described the intervening convictions approach less concisely: "[C]onvictions for the first
two crimes must have been rendered before commission of the third crime [and] the
first conviction must have been rendered before the second crime was committed." Id. at
681-82.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 73-135.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 136-178.
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easier to apply
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Problems Encountered under the Three Previous
Convictions Requirement
Originally, the ACCA provided no clear definition of "convic-
tion." Consequently, courts that attempted to interpret the statute
were faced with the question of whether:
"three previous convictions" should be construed literally to
mean any three felony convictions, regardless of whether the
three predicate felonies were committed simultaneously during a
single spasm of criminal activity; or whether it should be con-
strued as a reference to the number of prior occasions on which
a defendant has engaged in, and been convicted of, violent crim-
inal conduct.20
The original statutory language produced confusion and uncer-
tainty For example, would a kidnapping coupled with a rape con-
stitute one conviction or two7 21 Would multiple burglaries that oc-
curred on different days, yet brought by the prosecutor in one
judicial proceeding, constitute one conviction or multiple
convictions9 22
In United States v. Petty,2 3 the Eighth Circuit adopted a lit-
eral interpretation of "conviction." Petty was tried and convicted
of several drug offenses, interstate transportation of ammunition
by a convicted felon, and possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon. 24 The defendant was sentenced to twenty years imprison-
ment for the drug and interstate transportation charges and given
a concurrent twenty-two year enhanced sentence for possession of
a firearm by a convicted felon pursuant to the ACCA.25 To trigger
application of the ACCA, the court relied on previous felony con-
victions of Petty in New York state. Specifically, he had six rob-
bery convictions based on a single indictment for simultaneously
20. United States v. Towne, 870 F.2d 880, 889 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1101
(1989) (emphasis in original). Also, the three previous convictions requirement "fail[ed] to
indicate whether the required previous convictions can result from a single judicial pro-
ceeding." United States v. Herbert, 860 F.2d 620, 622 (5th Cir. 1988).
21. See, e.g., Towne, 870 F.2d at 889-91.
22. See, e.g., Herbert, 860 F.2d at 621-22; United States v. Wicks, 833 F.2d 192,
193 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Greene, 810 F.2d 999, 1000 (11th Cir. 1986).
23. 798 F.2d 1157 (8th Cir. 1986), vacated, 481 U.S. 1034 (1987).
24. Id. at 1158-59.
25. Id. at 1159.
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robbing six different people in a restaurant.2" Petty argued that
these robberies constituted one conviction for purposes of sentence
enhancement, but the Eighth Circuit disagreed and upheld the en-
hanced sentence.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, the
Solicitor General filed a brief admitting that it was a mistake to
have applied the ACCA to Petty 28 He stated that the ACCA is
ambiguous29 and that "the legislative history strongly supports the
conclusion that the statute was intended to reach multiple crimi-
nal episodes that were distinct in time, not multiple felony convic-
tions arising out of a single criminal episode."30 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari but remanded the case to the Eighth Cir-
cuit with instructions to consider the Solicitor General's brief.3'
The Eighth Circuit subsequently vacated Petty's enhanced sen-
tence,3 2 indicating that "convictions" under the ACCA must be
felony convictions resulting from "criminal episodes" that were
distinct in time.3
3
Other circuits hav likewise interpreted the three previous
convictions requirement using the criminal episodes approach. 4 In
United States v Herbert,3 5 the Fifth Circuit addressed the issue
of distinct criminal episodes tried in a single judicial proceeding.
Herbert was convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon. He
26. Id. at 1159-60.
27. Id. at 1160.
28. United States v. Petty, 828 F.2d 2, 3 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S.
1057 (1988).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Petty v. United States, 481 U.S. 1034, 1034-35 (1987), on remand, 828 F.2d 2
(8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1057 (1988).
32. Petty, 828 F.2d at 3.
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., United States v. Gillies, 851 F.2d 492, 497 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding
that convictions based on crimes committed in different places and at different times con-
stitute separate felonies, though committed on the same evening); United States v. Rush,
840 F.2d 580, 581-82 (8th Cir.) ("it is the criminal episodes underlying the convictions, not
the dates of conviction, that must be distinct to trigger the provisions of the ACCA"), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 857 (1988); United States v. Wicks, 833 F.2d 192, 194 (9th Cir. 1987)
(felonies committed at different places and at different times were intended to be counted
as separate felonies within the scope of the statute), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 831 (1988);
United States v. Greene, 810 F.2d 999, 1000 (11th Cir. 1986) (convictions on four differ-
ent burglaries ai separate locations and at four separate times should be considered four
separate felonies to satisfy the previous convictions requirement of the statute), cert. de-
nied, 110 S. Ct. 1322 (1990).
35. 860 F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1988).
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had previously been convicted of an assault and two counts of bur-
glary, on which the government attempted to base sentence en-
hancement under the ACCA. The assault conviction was unques-
tionably a separate conviction. However, the burglary convictions,
which resulted from burglaries occurring several days apart, were
returned in a single trial. The government contended that these
two convictions constituted separate convictions under the
ACCA.3 6
In determining whether the ACCA was applicable, the Fifth
Circuit considered that, "[o]n its face, the term 'three previous
convictions' does not appear to be ambiguous. The government,
however, through the solicitor general, has previously conceded
that [the] language in [the] statute was ambiguous.13 7 The court
then summarized the issue before it: "[I]n Petty [the ACCA]
failed to indicate whether the required previous convictions could
arise from a single transaction. [I]n this case [it] fails to in-
dicate whether the required previous convictions can result from a
single judicial proceeding. In both instances the statute is ambigu-
ous."3 8 Consequently, the Fifth Circuit considered the legislative
history of the ACCA but found that it, "like the statute itself, is
ambiguous." 39 The Fifth Circuit ultimately upheld Herbert's sen-
tence by concluding that when "a defendant is convicted in a sin-
gle judicial proceeding for multiple counts arising from separate
distinct criminal transactions that those convictions should be
treated as multiple convictions under [the ACCA]."4°
B. Congressional Clarification
On November 18, 1988, Congress, perhaps realizing the in-
herent ambiguity of the ACCA, attempted to clarify the predicate
offense requirement.4' The amendment was included in a large
piece of legislation entitled the Anti-Drug Abuse Act.4 2 It pro-
vides that the predicate convictions must be for felonies "commit-
ted on occasions different from one another.' 4 3 Under this amend-
ment, a kidnapping coupled with rape apparently would constitute
36. Id. at 621.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 621-22.
39. Id. at 622.
40. Id. (relying primarily on the reasoning of Petty).
41. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7056, 102 Stat. 4402 (1988).
42. Id.
43. Id.
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one conviction for the purpose of sentence enhancement. Further-
more, two burglaries that occur on separate occasions but result in
convictions during a single judicial proceeding will count as multi-
ple convictions for the purpose of sentence enhancement. How-
ever, the three previous convictions requirement remains ambigu-
ous despite congressional efforts because of the emergence of an
alternative to the criminal episodes approach: This note identifies
the alternative as the "intervening convictions approach."
II. THE NEWEST WRINKLE: UNITED STATES V BALASCSAK
United States v Balascsak44 offered the first opportunity for
a federal circuit court to interpret the three previous convictions
requirement following the 1988 amendment to the ACCA. In
Balascsak, the defendant pled guilty to a charge of possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon. The government sought an enhanced
sentence under the ACCA based on Balascsak's prior burglary
convictions: Balascsak was convicted on May 21, 1981, of a bur-
glary committed on November 30, 1980;4' he was then convicted
on February 22, 1982, for two burglaries committed in July
1981.46
In an en banc decision, the Third Circuit developed a new
method of determining the existence of a previous conviction
under the ACCA, the "intervening convictions approach." Chief
Judge Gibbons wrote a plurality opinion for six of the twelve
judges sitting,47 while Judge Greenberg wrote for the five dissent-
ers.48 Judge Becker wrote the single concurring opinion, in which
he adopted the criminal episodes theory articulated by the dissent-
ers but applied it in a way that produced the plurality's result.49
Thus, in actuality, the panel was evenly divided over which theory
should apply to the three previous convictions requirement.
The majority opinion began by recognizing the vagueness of
44. 873 F.2d 673 (3d Cir. 1989) (en banc), aff'd, 902 F.2d 1558 (1990), cert. de-
nied, 111 S. Ct. 173 (1990).
45. Id. at 685 (Greenberg, J., dissenting).
46. See id. at 685 (Greenberg, J., dissenting). The specific date of these two burgla-
ries was not mentioned by the Balascsak plurality. All that was noted was that Balascsak
had committed two robberies some time between 10:45 P.M. on July 10 and 7:00 A.M. on
July 11. Id. at 675.
47. See id. at 673.
48. See id. at 685 (Greenberg, J., dissenting).
49. See id. at 684 (Becker, J., concurring).
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the three previous convictions requirement.50 It then looked to the
legislative history of the ACCA for clarification,5' concluding that
the congressional intention was to thwart career criminals.
52
Therefore, the plurality reasoned, the defendant must have inter-
vening convictions after each criminal offense to receive the
ACCA sentence enhancement. 53 In other words, "the first convic-
tion must have been rendered before the second crime was com-
mitted."54 Likewise, the second conviction must be in place prior
to commission of the third crime. The Balascsak plurality be-
lieved this intervening convictions approach to be more compatible
with congressional intent.55
The remaining judges held that the intervening convictions
requirement is unwarranted. Both the dissenting and concurring
opinions emphasized that Congress did not specifically mention an
intervening convictions requirement.56 Therefore, the court should
not write one into the statute.
The question of whether to apply the intervening convictions
approach or the criminal episodes approach was eventually re-
solved by the Third Circuit in United States v Schoolcraft,5 7 de-
cided shortly after Balascsak. One of the issues before the court
in Schoolcraft was the validity of the defendant's sentence en-
hancement under the ACCA.5' The sentence enhancement was
based on three previous convictions: a conviction in 1978 for bur-
glary,59 a conviction in 1982 for a robbery committed in 1980, and
a conviction in 1983 for three armed robberies committed during
a two hour period in 1981.60
The two approaches would produce opposite results. Under
the intervening convictions approach, the three convictions would
not trigger ACCA sentence enhancement because the second con-
viction (in 1982) was not in place before commission of the third
50. See id. at 678-79.
51. See id. at 679-82.
52. See id. at 683.
53. See id. at 682.
54. Id.
55. See id. at 683.
56. Id. at 684 (Becker, J., concurring); id. at 685 (Greenberg, J., dissenting).
57. 879 F.2d 64 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 995 (1989).
58. See id. at 71.
59. Id. (the opinion did not provide a more specific date for the 1978 burglary
conviction).
60. Id.
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offense61 (in 1981). However, under the criminal episodes ap-
proach, the three previous convictions are sufficient because the
timing of the convictions in relation to the adjudication is irrele-
vant so long as the crimes themselves were distinct in time.6 2
Since Balascsak failed to resolve the previous convictions
controversy, the Schoolcraft majority decided, by a two to one
vote, to adopt the criminal episodes approach presented in the dis-
senting and concurring opinions of Balascsak.3 The Schoolcraft
majority held that "for the purposes of enhanced sentencing under
the ACCA, a defendant need not be convicted of one predi-
cate offense before committing the next predicate offense." 4 The
dissenting judge favored the intervening convictions approach
"[f]or the reasons stated by Chief Judge Gibbons in United States
v Balascsak.'6 5
Other federal circuits have also been unwilling to accept an
intervening convictions approach. In United States v Wicks66 de-
cided prior to Balascsak, the defendant's alleged three previous
convictions resulted from burglaries that occurred on the same
night at different locations but were prosecuted in one proceeding.
Wicks argued that the ACCA sentence enhancement did not ap-
ply to him because it was designed for career criminals who "have
failed in rehabilitation after three successive prosecutions. '67 The
Ninth Circuit rejected this intervening convictions argument say-
ing that "[t]he plain language of the statute contradicts Wicks's
contention; the language encompasses any person with three pred-
icate convictions, whenever obtained." 68
The Sixth Circuit has not yet adopted either approach, but
has discussed the issue in two opinions. In United States v
Pedigo,"9 the court commented favorably on Wicks as "indi-
61. The "third offense" consisted of the three armed robberies. This is considered a
single "conviction" under both the criminal episodes approach and the intervening convic-
tions approach.
62. See supra text accompanying notes 30-33.
63. Schoolcraft, 879 F.2d at 74.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 75 (Scirica, J., dissenting).
66. 833 F.2d 192 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 831 (1988).
67. Id. at 193.
68. Id. Despite the holding in Wicks that "three predicate convictions, whenever ob-
tained" are sufficient for sentence enhancement, the court agreed with United States v.
Petty, 828 F.2d 2 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1057 (1988), that the underlying
criminal episodes had to be distinct in time. Id. at 194; see supra text accompanying note
33.
69. 879 F.2d 1315 (6th Cir. 1989).
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cat[ing] that in order to establish three prior convictions, there
must be three corresponding criminal episodes which are distinct
in time. The timing of the convictions is not important.1 70 How-
ever, in United States v Taylor,71 the Sixth Circuit was less hos-
tile toward the intervening convictions approach:
[W]e note that the Third Circuit [in Balascsak] has recently
ruled that, "at an absolute minimum, convictions for the first
two crimes must have been rendered before commission of the
third crime." [The defendant] has not raised this issue, how-
ever, and, even if he had, it appears that his convictions for bur-
glary were obtained well before he was convicted of felonious
assault.72
Balascsak is the only federal appeals court decision in which
the intervening convictions approach has been adopted by even a
plurality Every other "federal court of appeals that has consid-
ered the issue has adopted the [criminal] episodes approach
[and has] 'simply required that the criminal episodes be dis-
tinct in time.' ,,73Therefore, the question is whether the interven-
ing convictions approach is an anomaly that should be rejected or
the appropriate method for applying the ACCA9
III. THE CRIMINAL EPISODES APPROACH V THE INTERVENING
CONVICTIONS APPROACH
A. The Role of Courts
Unless Congress again amends the ACCA, courts must con-
tinue to speculate as to which approach, criminal episodes or in-
tervening convictions, is proper. This section examines rules of
statutory construction and the legislative history of the ACCA
and concludes that the intervening convictions approach is better-
reasoned.
1. Statutory Construction
Most of the courts that have rejected the intervening convic-
70. Id. at 1317 n.3.
71. 882 F.2d 1018 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2592 (1990).
72. Id. at 1029 (quoting Balascsak, 873 F.2d at 681).
73. United States v. Towne, 870 F.2d 880, 889-90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S.
1101 (1989). This trend has continued. See United States v. Anderson, 921 F.2d 335, 340
(lst Cir. 1990); United States v. Howard, 918 F.2d 1529, 1538 (11th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Schieman, 894 F.2d 909, 913 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, I11 S. Ct. 155 (1990). No
federal circuit courts have adopted the intervening convictions approach.
11891991]
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tions approach have argued that inquiry into legislative intent is
unnecessary because the ACCA is unambiguous. For example, the
court in United States v Schoolcraft74 stated that, when inter-
preting a statute, "the starting point must be the language of the
statute itself. If the terms of the statute are plain and unam-
biguous, judicial inquiry is complete. 75
This "plain meaning" rule is certainly cogent. The first step
in analyzing any legal problem involving a statute is simply to
read the statute.76 However, application of this canon of statutory
construction is not set in stone. On one extreme is the view that
"[s] purious use of legislative history must not swallow the legisla-
tion so as to give point to the quip that only when legislative his-
tory is doubtful do you go to the statute. ' 77 The opposite extreme
is that when "[t]he legislative history of [the statute] is ambigu-
ous we must look primarily to the statutes themselves to
find the legislative intent. ' 78 In addition it has been contended
that there is no way to determine which method of interpretation
is preferable.79 Therefore, while the plain meaning rule is quite
prevalent, other canons of statutory construction encourage courts
to look beyond the words of a statute in order to determine the
drafters' actual intent.
Courts should adopt a middle position regarding use of legis-
lative history-
In final analysis, any question of statutory construction requires
the judge to decide how the legislature intended its enactment to
apply to the case at hand. The language of the statute is usually
sufficient to answer that question, but "the reports are full of
cases" in which the will of the legislature is not reflected in a
74. 879 F.2d 64 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 995 (1989).
75. Id. at 74; accord United States v. Wicks, 833 F.2d 192, 193-94 (9th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 831 (1988) (" '[W]e look first to the statutory language and then to
the legislative history if the statutory language is unclear' [In this instance] the stat-
utory language is clear." (quoting Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184
n.29 (1978) (emphasis in the original)).
76. See, e.g., H. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 202 (1967) (Frankfurter's "threefold im-
perative to law students [was] (1) Read the statute; (2) read the statute; (3) read the
statute!").
77. Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. Rav.
527, 543 (1947).
78. Citizen's to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 412 n.29 (1971).
79. See Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes
and the Constitution, 37 CASE W Ras. L. REv. 179, 217 (1986) (arguing that the test of
time is the only way to evaluate a court's interpretation).
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literal reading of the words it has chosen. 0
The ACCA was first read literally in United States v Petty,""
where six simultaneously committed robberies were considered six
separate convictions.8 2 Eventually, the Solicitor General admitted
"that the phrase 'three previous convictions' is ambiguous" and
that it was an error to apply the ACCA to Petty 83 The court in
United States v BalascsakP4 stated:
The history of the Petty case establishes that the language "who
has three previous convictions" does not mean simply "who at
the time of sentencing has been convicted of three separate of-
fenses." Had that been the intended meaning, the Solicitor Gen-
eral obviously would have defended the enhanced sentence in
Petty. Short of such a mechanical reading of the "who has three
previous convictions" language, however, the meaning of the
provision is far from clear. The Petty history establishes that the
temporal term "previous" does not mean merely previous to the
instant sentence, and the section does not with any clarity point
to the additional event to which "previous" refers. s5
Other factors further indicate that courts should look beyond
the plain meaning rule in interpreting the ACCA. Congress by its
prior attempt to clarify the statute has acknowledged the ACCA's
ambiguity 8" The amendment only resulted in an alternative
method of application as articulated in Balascsak.a7 Also, the
name of the Act alone creates substantial doubt regarding proper
application of the ACCA. Should someone who robs three homes
in one night be characterized as a "career criminal"988
80. Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 577 (1982) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting). A middle position was also advocated in the dissenting opinion in United States v.
Wicks, 833 F.2d 192, 194 (9th Cir. 1987) (Pregerson, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 831 (1988). Quoting Judge Learned Hand, the opinion stated: "It is one of the surest
indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the diction-
ary; but to remember that statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish,
whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their meaning." Id.
(quoting Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir.), affid, 326 U.S. 404 (1945)).
81. 798 F.2d 1157 (8th Cir. 1986), vacated, 481 U.S. 1034 (1987).
82. For a discussion of the facts of Petty, see supra text accompanying notes 23-27.
83. For discussion of the Solicitor General's brief, see supra text accompanying notes
28-33.
84. 873 F.2d 673, 678 (3d Cir. 1989) (en banc), affd, 902 F.2d 1558 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, IlII S. Ct. 173 (1990).
85. Id. at 679.
86. For a discussion of the 1988 amendments to the ACCA, see supra text accompa-
nying notes 41-43.
87. For a discussion of Balascsak, see supra text accompanying notes 44-73.
88. Looking to a statute's title to glean the purpose of the act has long been recog-
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2. The Legislative History
The legislative history of the ACCA includes no specific dis-
cussion regarding methods of determining the requisite convic-
tions. The original bill was an attempt by Senator Arlen Specter
to create federal jurisdiction over state armed burglary and armed
robbery offenses committed by career criminals.89 The purpose of
this legislation was to deal with repeat, habitual offenders.90
As originally proposed, the federal government would prose-
cute defendants who were charged with burglary or robbery and
had two prior burglary or robbery convictions. 91 If convicted in
federal court, the defendant would be sentenced to life imprison-
ment with no opportunity for suspended sentence.92
Senator Specter then introduced a revised bill that lessened
the penalty to a minimum of fifteen years without suspension.
93
The more lenient sentencing was introduced to allow for circum-
stances in which a life sentence might not be justified.94 Further-
more, the revised bill recognized and accounted for the rapid de-
cline in the number of offenses committed by career criminals
once they reach the age of thirty 95 This version of the bill was
passed by both houses9" but was pocket vetoed by President Rea-
gan because of potential federalism problems. 97 The bill was al-
tered to allow federal prosecution only where the crime gives rise
to federal jurisdiction.98 However, all versions of this bill required
that two convictions be in place before committing the offense un-
derlying the third conviction.99
nized. See, e.g., Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 462 (1892).
89. Career Criminal Life Sentence Act of 1981: Hearings on S. 1688, S. 1689 and
S. 1690 Before the Subcommittee on Juvenile Justice of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 97th Cong., ist Sess. 3 (1981) (statement of Senator Arlen Specter).
90. S. 1688, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 1 (1981).
91. Id. at 4.
92. Id.
93. See S. REP. No. 585, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1982).
94. See id. at 77.
95. Id.
96. See S. REP. No. 190, 98th Cong., ist Sess. 3 (1983).
97. See id., H.R. REP. No. 1073, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1984). Conflicts may have
emerged from the relationship that the Act created between local and federal prosecutors.
98. S. 52, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984), reprinted in Armed Career Criminal Act:
Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Crime of the Committee of the Judiciary, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 7, 10 (1984). Bank robbery is an example of a crime that could be prose-
cuted by the federal government under this version of the statute. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §
2113 (1988) (making bank robbery a federal offense).
99. See S. 52, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2118 (1984), reprinted in Armed Career Crim-
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The House of Representatives- then proposed to make the
ACCA a penalty provision for the federal crime of possession of a
firearm by a felon.100 Because the penalty was to follow commis-
sion of a federal crime, all federalism concerns were eliminated. 10'
Congress would therefore not have to create federal jurisdiction
over state crimes or limit application of the statute to situations
already based on federal jurisdiction. Under this proposal, a felon
who has been arrested for possession of a firearm and has three
previous convictions would be eligible for an enhanced sentence.10 2
This proposal was enacted in 1984.103
The original version of the ACCA required that a defendant
have two convictions in place prior to commission of the third
crime; 04 the purpose was to incarcerate the career criminal. The
revision introduced by the House and passed into law was solely
intended to eliminate federalism concerns, not to change the entire
purpose of the law Consequently, at an absolute minimum, two
convictions should be in place before commission of the crime un-
derlying the third required conviction.'0 5
The relationship between the first and second convictions
nal Act: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Crime of the Committee of the Judiciary,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1984) ("[A burglary or robbery offense, which may lead to sen-
tence enhancement under the ACCA] shall not be prosecuted unless the United States
proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant has been convicted of at least two
[previous] offenses "). Balascsak noted:
[A] person who committed three burglaries on the same night could not (with-
out other prior convictions) be considered a career criminal. Only a person who
had been twice convicted before committing the third crime would possibly be
prosecuted under the bill. While the required relationship between the two priors
themselves is not obvious, it is obvious that the two priors must have resulted in
convictions before the third crime took place.
United States v. Balascsak, 873 F.2d 673, 681 (3d Cir. 1989) (en banc) (emphasis in
onginal), aff'd, 902 F.2d 1558 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 173 (1990).
100. H.R. REp. No. 1073, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3182, 3664-65.
101. See id. at 5, reprinted an 1984 US. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3665.
102. See ad. at i, 5, reprinted an 1984 US. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 3661.
103. See Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1802, 98 Stat. 2185 (1984).
104. See supra text accompanying note 99.
105. See United States v. Balasesak, 873 F.2d 673, 681 (3d Cir. 1989) (en bane),
affd, 902 F.2d 1558 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, I11 S. Ct. '173 (1990). The counterargument
is that Congress partially altered its original intent through the compromises made with
President Reagan in order to alleviate any federalism problems with the statute. See supra
text accompanying notes 97-98. Under this theory, the prior drafts of what eventually be-
came the ACCA are not important to the analysis. Indeed, Judge Greenberg, writing in
dissent, agreed that "reliance upon the language of prior *drafts of the statute [is] unper-
suasive." Balascsak, 873 F.2d at 686 (Greenberg, J., dissenting).
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poses a more difficult question because Congress has never indi-
cated whether the first conviction must be in place before the
commission of the crime underlying the second conviction. How-
ever, Congress probably intended that the first conviction be in
place before commission of the second crime in order to enhance
the sentences of only career criminals. 10 By analogy, most state
habitual offender statutes are interpreted as requiring:
that each successive felony be committed after the previous
felony conviction in order to count towards habitual criminal
status.
Accordingly, it has been held that two or more convictions
on the same day on two or more indictments, or on two or more
counts of the same indictment, constitute only one conviction for
the purposes of the habitual offender statute. 07
The underlying rationale is that a habitual criminal statute
serves "as a warning to first time offenders and provide[s] them
with an opportunity to reform. [S]anctions become increas-
ingly severe 'not so much that [the] defendant has sinned
more than once as that he is deemed incorrigible when he persists
in violations of the law after conviction of previous infractions."'' 0
In other words, sentence enhancement can be given only after
"conviction and punishment have failed to reform. "o109
The ACCA certainly supports a similar interpretation. In or-
der to incapacitate only the career criminal incapable of rehabili-
tation, Congress probably would have adopted the intervening
convictions approach had it expressly addressed this issue. The in-
tervening convictions approach provides the felon an opportunity
to reform before being incarcerated for an increased period of
time. Under the criminal episodes approach, however, an individ-
ual who commits three crimes prior to being convicted of any is
immediately eligible for sentence enhancement and receives only
one opportunity for rehabilitation. Therefore, it is important to as-
106. Balascsak, 873 F.2d at 682.
107. State v. Carlson, 560 P.2d 26, 29 (Alaska 1977); accord State v. Ellis, 214
Neb. 172, 176, 133 N.W.2d 391, 394 (1983).
108. Carlson, 560 P.2d at 28-29 (quoting Annotation, Chronological or Procedural
Sequence of Former Convictions as Affecting Enhancement of Penalty for Subsequent Of-
fense Under Habitual Criminal Statutes, 24 A.L.R.2d 1247, 1249 (1952)).
109. Kansas v. Lohrbach, 217 Kan. 588, 592, 538 P.2d 678, 681 (1975) (emphasis in
original). Lohrbach is another state case adopting an intervening convictions approach. See
id. at 593, 538 P.2d at 682-83 (holding that the trial court erred in sentencing defendant as
habitual offender based on four prior felony convictions rendered on the same date).
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certain the congressional view of rehabilitation.
There are several indications that Congress intended the
ACCA to apply to those criminals who had failed rehabilitation as
opposed to those who had no opportunity at rehabilitation. Assis-
tant Attorney General Stephen Trott testified before the House
Subcommittee on Crime when the House of Representatives con-
sidered the ACCA. He stated:
These are people who have demonstrated, by virtue of their defi-
nition, that locking them up and letting them go doesn't do any
good. They go on again, you lock them up, you let them go, it
doesn't do any good, they are back for a third time. At that
juncture we should say, "That's it; time out; it is all over. We as
responsible people, will never give you the opportunity to do this
again."110
Furthermore, Senator Specter, the author of the ACCA, discussed
from the Senate floor his concern regarding career criminals:
The critical need to target the habitual offender was also one of
the major findings in 1973 by the National Commission on
Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, of which I was a mem-
ber. One of the Commission's key recommendations included the
need to incarcerate unrehabilitative repeat violent felons for
lengthy periods It is my view that the only way to deal with
such hardened criminals is with stiff prison terms with no pros-
pect for parole. It was this view that led to my sponsorship of
the Armed Career Criminal Act which was enacted during the
98th Congress.""'
Senator Specter has repeatedly demonstrated support for re-
habilitation efforts. While speaking at a congressional hearing, he
stated his desire "to have a correctional system that rehabilitates
where possible, and confines when rehabilitation is not possi-
ble."11 1 2 Indeed, Senator Specter has stated that one of his goals is
to assure "corrections programs designed to rehabilitate first or
second offenders convicted of violent felonies and incapacitate
third offenders with lengthy sentences . [This agenda] to im-
prove rehabilitation programs complements the approach of The
110. Armed Career Criminal Act: Hearing on H.R. 1627 and S. 52 Before the Sub-
comm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1984).
111. 134 CONG. Rac. 58,494 (daily ed. June 23, 1988).
112. Armed Robbery and Burglary Prevention Act: Hearing on H.R. 6386 Before
the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 4
(1982).
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Armed Career Criminal Act "113 Unlike the criminal epi-
sodes approach, the intervening convictions approach furthers
Senator Spector's goal of rehabilitation. Under this approach, the
ACCA would incarcerate only "the worst," as Senator Spector
characterizes the career criminal.
3. Statutory Effect
An example of the type of individual the ACCA was
designed to remove from society is Warren Bland."1 4 Bland's crim-
inal career began in 1958 when he stabbed a man with a knife. 15
Bland was convicted and given probation for this offense."" In
1960, Bland was arrested for a series of sexual assaults. Although
the female victims of these assaults fought back and avoided rape,
one had her jaw broken."17 Following conviction for these offenses,
Bland was sent to the state mentally disordered sex offender pro-
gram for seven years."' Soon after his release, Bland was con-
victed of two rapes. He served another seven years for these
offenses." 9
At this point, under the intervening convictions approach,
Bland would be eligible for ACCA sentence enhancement if later
found in possession of a firearm. However, after serving seven
years for the rapes, Bland kidnapped an eleven year old girl and
hor mother 120 He molested the mother and sexually assaulted and
tortured the girl.' 2 ' For these offenses Bland plea-bargained his
way to a mere three-year sentence.' 2 Following release, Bland
sodomized and tortured a small boy Although he was sentenced
to serve nine years for this offense, he was released on parole in
four and a half years. 2 ' When Bland finished serving this sen-
tence in 1986, he became a suspect in the murder of a seven year
old girl.1"4 While investigating Bland, police found a gun in his
113. 135 CONG. REC. S103 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1989).
114. See Leo, A Criminal Lack of Common Sense, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP.,
Aug. 21, 1989, at 56.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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car. This enabled the federal government to prosecute for posses-
sion of a firearm by a convicted felon.125 As a result, Bland was
finally given a life sentence, without parole, under the ACCA.126
Although this is an extreme example, it shows exactly what
the ACCA is designed to do. Warren Bland represents "the
worst" to which Senator Specter referred.127 After numerous
chances, Bland failed to reform, and has now been removed from
society
It is arguable that the intervening convictions approach is too
lenient and fails to remove dangerous criminals from society
quickly enough. Many individuals not yet eligible for sentence en-
hancement under the intervening convictions approach may al-
ready constitute substantial threats to society Such individuals
are perhaps as much a threat as those who do fall into the net cast
by the intervening convictions approach. For instance, Congress
may consider Mr. Balascsak, who has a history of committing
burglaries, to be as much of a threat to society as Mr. Bland. If
this is true and Congress did intend to incarcerate such individu-
als pursuant to the ACCA, then it probably would favor the crim-
inal episodes approach.
The ACCA merely enhances the sentence of a felon who is in
possession of a firearm. One can imagine an individual who serves
one concurrent jail term for three previous convictions and then
obtains a gun illegally after being released. The felon has had one
chance at rehabilitation, yet has broken the law again. The fire-
arm may have been obtained through the black market, which is
malum in se,' 28 or from a legitimate dealer, which is likewise ille-
gal.129 Under this reasoning, the intervening convictions approach
may be too lenient because the individual, who has been given an
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See infra note 153 and accompanying text.
128. An act is malum in se if "it is inherently and essentially evil, that is, immoral in
its nature and injurious in its consequences " BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 959 (6th
ed. 1990). Dealings with the black market would generally fall within this category.
129. A legitimate dealer is prohibited from selling a firearm or ammunition to some-
one the dealer knows "has been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprison-
ment for a term exceeding I year." 27 C.F.R. § 178.99"(c)(1) (1990). Thus, the convicted
felon has probably been untruthful on the various registration forms that one must com-
plete when purchasing a firearm. These forms inquire whether the purchaser has any previ-
ous felony convictions and an affirmative answer will preclude a felon's purchase of the
firearm. See, e.g., United States v. Balascsak, 873 F.2d 623, 674 (3d Cir. 1989) (en banc)
(discussing false information to which defendant attested when purchasing a firearm from
a licensed gun dealer), aff'd, 902 F.2d 1558 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 173 (1990).
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opportunity for rehabilitation, avoids sentence enhancement with-
out regard to the threat to society
There are also those criminals who engage "in a 'Bonnie and
Clyde' type spree over a long period of time, but [have] managed
to evade apprehension." 130 These criminals are the most wily and
perhaps the most dangerous threat to society They may have
committed several crimes, but likely have three or fewer convic-
tions. If these convictions are not in the proper sequence with re-
spect to commission of subsequent felonies, then the criminals will
not be eligible for enhanced sentences under the intervening con-
victions approach.
These arguments against the intervening convictions ap-
proach are not persuasive. Ultimately, it must be recognized that
Congress required three previous convictions rather than one, thus
indicating its intent to afford criminals several opportunities to re-
form before imposing long term incarceration. Moreover, even in
an intervening convictions jurisdiction, defendants not eligible for
sentence enhancement may nevertheless be imprisoned for long
periods of time on the underlying criminal offense.' 3'
Lastly, those advocating the criminal episodes approach ar-
gue that the "recent [1988] amendment of the Armed Career
Criminal Act buttresses [their] analysis of the legislative in-
tent." 132 It is argued that because Congress clarified the law by
stating that the underlying offenses must be "committed on occa-
sions different from one another,"' 33 it explicitly rejected the idea
that there must be intervening convictions. However, Balascsak
was decided after Congress amended the ACCA. Congress there-
fore was likely not aware of the question Balascsak posed. In fact,
Congress was probably reacting to the Petty decision134 when it
130. Balascsak, 873 F.2d at 688 (Greenberg, J., dissenting).
131. For example, a defendant who has been convicted of two armed robberies and
has three previous convictions that are not in the proper sequence to trigger an enhanced
sentence under the intervening convictions approach will not necessarily go free. He will
still be sentenced for the robberies and for unlawful possession of a firearm. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g) (1988) (prohibiting possession of a firearm by a felon). Someone convicted of
violating section 922(g) can be imprisoned up to 10 years. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2)
(1988) ("Whoever knowingly violates subsection[] (g) of section 922 shall be
fined as provided in this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years or both.").
132. Balascsak, 873 F.2d at 688 (Greenberg, J., dissenting).
133. Id., see supra text accompanying notes 41-43 (discussing the 1988 amendment
to the ACCA).
134. United States v. Petty, 798 F.2d 1157 (8th Cir. 1986), vacated, 481 U.S. 1034
(1987).
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passed the 1988 amendment.13 5
Indeed, there is no relevant legislative history accompanying
the amended legislation. The fact that the amendment is merely
three lines of text contained within a massive bill dealing with a
separate subject suggests that little consideration went into the so-
called clarification of law Thus, it is doubtful that Congress has
seriously contemplated the intervening convictions approach one
way or the other. In contrast, the legislative history and intent of
the original ACCA strongly favors application of the intervening
convictions approach.
B. The Role of Congress
In addition to congressional intent, various policy considera-
tions further support the adoption of the intervening convictions
approach. This section argues that accuracy in the identification
of career criminals and ease of application require that Congress
again clarify the ACCA in favor of the intervening convictions
approach.
1. Predictive Accuracy
The selective incapacitation theory purports that "a small
number of offenders [are] responsible for a large portion of crimes
or arrests."' 36 This suggests that the crime rate can be reduced by
targeting a relatively small number of offenders for incapacita-
tion."3 7 Selective incapacitation effectively removes the most
threatening criminals from society 138 Congress has based the
ACCA upon similar notions of selective incapacitation. 3 9
135. For a discussion of the Petty case, see supra text and accompanying notes 21-
31. Because of the relatively harsh sentence given to the defendant in Petty, the case was
subject to much public attention. See U.S. Admits Error in Enhanced Sentence, Chicago
Daily L. Bull., May 7, 1987, at 1, col. 1-3; see also Brief of the Solicitor General of the
United States, United States v. Petty, 486 U.S. 1057 (1988) (No. 87-6768); supra text
accompanying notes 26-31. Congress was therefore more likely to be aware of the case and
influenced by its results.
136. Cohen, Selective Incapacitation" An Assessment, 1984 U. ILL. L. REv. 253, 253;
see Note, Selective Incapacitation: Reducing Crime Through Predictions of Recidivism,
96 HARV. L. Rav. 511, 511 (1982).
137. See Cohen, supra note 136, at 253.
138. See Note, supra note 136, at 512.
139. Congress accepted the premise "that a large percentage of crimes are com-
mitted by a very small percentage of repeat offenders." H.R. REP. No. 1073, 98th Cong.,
2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1984 US. CODE CONG. & ADMiN. NEWS 3182, 3661. Congress
reached this conclusion through reliance on studies conducted by Professor Marvin Wolf-
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The problem, however, is accurately predicting which individ-
uals will commit most of the crimes.14° Initially, predictions of re-
cidivism were based upon general criteria such as violence or dan-
gerousness. These criteria proved ineffective because individuals
were mistakenly classified as violent or dangerous between fifty-
four and ninety percent of the time.1 41
To avoid these "false positives,"'142 researchers have begun to
focus on high rate crimes, such as robbery or burglary, as the cri-
terion offenses rather than violence or dangerousness.1 43 These
studies have produced various levels of accuracy For instance, a
study conducted for INSLAW was only twenty-nine percent accu-
rate in predicting the worst recidivists.144 A Rand study could
boast only fifty percent accuracy in identifying high rate offend-
ers. 4 5 In a more recent INSLAW study, however, eighty-five per-
cent of those predicted to be recidivists were rearrested for a seri-
ous offense, while only thirty-three percent of those identified as
noncareer criminals were rearrested. 46
While these percentages may be acceptable, 147 the predictive
accuracy of the ACCA in identifying career criminals would be
increased under the intervening convictions approach. This con-
tention rests upon the assumption that the more incorrigible a de-
fendant is, the more likely that defendant is to commit future
gang, the Rand Corporation, the Institute for Law and Social Research ("INSLAW"),
and Dr. John C. Ball. See id. at 1-2, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
at 3661-62. Most of these authorities are preeminent in the selective incapacitation field.
See generally Note, supra note 136 (examining prominent selective incapacitation studies,
including several of the same sources upon which Congress relied).
140. See Cohen, supra note 136, at 260 ("[P]redictive accuracy remains an impor-
tant issue to be resolved before implementing any selective incapacitation policy."); Note,
supra note 136, at 514 ("[T]he assumption that [career crinunals are identifiable]
remains controversial.").
141. See Monahan, The Prediction of Violent Criminal Behavior: A Methodological
Critique Prospectus, in PANEL ON RESEARCH OF DETERRENT AND INCAPACITATIVE EF-
FECTs, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION 244, 246-50
(1978).
142. False positives are instances where individuals are "incorrectly predicted to
commit future crimes." Cohen, supra note 136, at 261 n.16.
143. See Note, supra note 136, at 515,
144. See K. WILLIAMS, THE SCOPE AND PREDICTION OF RECIDIVISM 27 (1979).
145. See P GREENWOOD & A. ABRAHAMSE, SELECTIVE INCAPACITATION 47-53
(1982).
146. See W RHODES, H. TYSON, J. WEEKLEY, C. CONLY & G. POWELL, DEVELOP-
ING CRITERIA FOR IDENTIFYING CAREER CRIMINALS 54 (1982).
147. Professor Monahan suggests that "prediction is morally acceptable even when
extremely inaccurate." J. MONAHAN, PREDICTING VIOLENT BEHAVIOR: AN ASSESSMENT OF
CUNICAL TECHNIQUES 35 (1981).
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crimes. 148
The predictive accuracy problem is especially exigent given
the current version of the ACCA which closely resembles the less
accurate recidivism models that were based upon violence or dan-
gerousness. 149 Originally, the ACCA was triggered only by previ-
ous convictions for burglary or robbery 150 These criterion offenses
are the same ones upon which the more accurate models are
based. However, in 1986 the ACCA was amended to be triggered
by three previous convictions for a violent felony, a serious drug
offense, or both.151 Consequently, the current version of the
ACCA may falsely predict a career criminal as often as ninety
percent of the time.15
2
In addition to removing dangerous criminals from society, a
selective incapacitation scheme could decrease the burgeoning
prison population by successfully targeting the most active
criminals.1 53 Specifically, "[i]f high-rate criminals could be sen-
148. Put simply, the offender who does not feel the moral sting of a conviction is
more likely to be caught in the intervening convictions net. See supra text accompanying
notes 107-13. For an argument that an intervening convictions interpretation will target the
most incorrigible offenders, see supra text accompanying notes 107-13.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 140-41; see also Note, supra note 136, at
515 n.22 ("It is extremely difficult to predict any low-base-rate event.").
150. See supra text accompanying note i03.
151. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1402(a), 100 Stat.
3207-39. Admittedly, one of the offenses included in the ACCA's definition of "violent
felony" is burglary. See 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B) (1988). Burglary is, indeed, a high rate
crime upon which the more accurate prediction models are based. However, the ACCA
also defines "violent felony" as a crime pumshable by imprisonment for over a year that
"has as an element the use, attempted use, or the threatened use, of physical force against
another; or involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical
injury to another." Id. This latter definition includes low rate events of the type upon which
the less accurate prediction models are based. See supra text accompanying notes 140-41.
An ancillary issue created by the focus on violent felonies and serious drug offenses is
the proper definition of "burglary" under the ACCA. There is some dispute over whether
to apply statutory or common law burglary. See Comment, The Armed Career Criminal
Act: When Burglary Is Not Burglary, 26 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 171 (1989) (concluding
that Congress intended that courts apply state definitions of burglary).
152. See supra text accompanying note 141.
153. See Cohen, supra note 136, at 253-54 ("Researchers have discovered that
a small number of offenders [are] responsible for a large portion of crimes With
such a distribution, the potential exists to achieve the same, or improved, crime reduction
benefits from incarceration by selectively targeting prison use on the smaller number of
high-rate offenders."); Armed Career Criminal Act, Hearing on H.R. 1627 and S. 52
Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the Comm. of the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 15
(1984) ("You can't prosecute everybody. You can't put everybody in jail whom you'd like
to It is discretionary and you always select the worst group. [These career criminals
are] the worst group It is that simple, and the [ACCA] will have an enormously
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tenced to prison for longer terms, low-rate offenders could be in-
carcerated for shorter periods, and the amount of crime on the
streets could conceivably be reduced without any increase in the
current prison population."'154 This is, of course, based upon the
presumption "that a large percentage of crimes are commit-
ted by a very small percentage of repeat offenders.' 55 The greater
accuracy that the intervening convictions approach affords facili-
tates this goal much more readily than the less accurate criminal
episodes approach.
2. Ease of Application
Adoption of the criminal episodes approach has lead to un-
certainty in the law Courts still have difficulty ascertaining previ-
ous convictions because they cannot easily determine when one
"occasion" ends and another "occasion" begins. The Balascsak
case illustrates this problem. Although Judge Becker, in his con-
curring opinion, did not adopt the intervening convictions applica-
tion of the ACCA, he did state that the statute should "ensnare
only hard core repeat offenders [and so] the separate criminal epi-
sode[s] requirement must be read rigorously [to require] that the
government prove convincingly that the crimes (and the episodes
of which they were part) were truly separate.' 15 The facts of
Balascsak made this distinction difficult because two of the de-
fendant's prior crimes occurred on the same night. Balascsak had
committed one burglary at 10:45 P.M. and a second burglary one
block away some time between 11:00 P.M. and 7:00 A.M. the follow-
ing mormng. 57 Therefore, the government faced the difficult evi-
dentiary task of proving that the crimes were "committed on occa-
sions different from one another.' 5
Moreover, the judiciary must split hairs to determine when
one "occasion" ends and another "occasion" begins.159 Judge
beneficial leveraging effect." (statement of Senator Specter)).
154. Note, supra note 136, at 512 (footnote omitted).
155. H.R. REP. No. 1073, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CoDE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3182, 3661.
156. United States v. Balascsak, 873 F.2d 673, 684 (3d Cir. 1989) (en bane)
(Becker, J., concurring), afl'd, 902 F.2d 1558 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 173
(1990).
157. Id. at 675.
158. See supra notes text accompanying notes 41-43 (discussing of the 1988 amend-
ment to the ACCA).
159. This realization caused Judge Becker to remark, "I concede my inability to
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Becker was not persuaded that the Balascsak burglaries occurred
on separate occasions. Accordingly, he concurred with the Balasc-
sak majority in vacating Balascsak's enhanced sentence. 160 The
five dissenting judges, however, were persuaded that the occasions
were separate.16 This vague evidentlary standard is likely to be a
continuing problem.
The most recent example of the ambiguity resulting from the
criminal episodes approach is United States v Schzeman.16 2 A
major issue in Schieman was whether the defendant's crime and
subsequent escape constituted one criminal episode or two.l6 3 On
May 1, 1974, the defendant burgled a business establishment. 64
After fleeing the scene with $30.50, including two roles of pennies,
Schieman walked three blocks to a public telephone. There he at-
tempted to call a taxicab to obtain transportation for his escape. 165
However, Schleman was observed by a police officer who was in-
vestigating the burglary When the officer approached the defend-
ant to question him, Schieman knocked him to the ground. 66 This
pushing incident, which occurred about five minutes following the
burglary,1 67 led to an aggravated assault conviction. 68
Apparently, the majority believed that five minutes and three
blocks were sufficient distinction to create two criminal episodes.
In determining whether the escape was separate from the bur-
glary, the majority concluded:
To consider the aggravated battery offense a continuation of the
burglary offense would preclude from [ACCA] consideration
any offense which is designed to prevent detection of the original
crime. Had Officer Sandell questioned Schieman about this rob-
bery the following day, or three weeks later, Schleman's attack
undoubtedly would be considered a separate and distinct epi-
sode. Once the original crime is complete, there is no principled
way to distinguish between an attack in response to an investiga-
establish a bright line, e.g., as to whether two days' or two weeks' hiatus is enough."
Balascsak, 873 F.2d at 685 (Becker, J., concurring).
160. See id. (Becker, J., concurring) (noting that this law should be developed on a
case-by-case basis).
161. Id. at 688 (Greenberg, J., dissenting).
162. 894 F.2d 909 (7th Cir. 1990).
163. Id. at 910.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 913 (Ripple, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 910.
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tion commenced within ten minutes of the burglary and an at-
tack in response to an investigation commenced a day after the
burglary. To make a distinction in this situation would grant the
criminal an unintended windfall for the quick detection of his
crime Because Schieman 'committed separate crimes
against separate victims in separate locations,' we find that
Schieman's offenses for burglary and aggravated battery should
count as two separate convictions for [ACCA] sentencing
purposes.1 19
In dissent, Judge Ripple argued that "the crimes were com-
mitted as part of the same operation or episode-a burglary and
the immediate escape. The crimes do not meet the rigorous stan-
dard that should be met for determining separate criminal epi-
sodes. 170 Despite disagreeing with the Schieman majority, how-
ever, Judge Ripple stated that such a determination "is hardly an
impossible task. ' 171 He argued that felony-murder requires a simi-
lar determination. "'A transaction is continuous [for felony-mur-
der purposes] when the commission of both the homicide and fel-
ony are closely connected in time, place and continuity of
action.' "1172 Furthermore, Judge Ripple contended that since
RICO requires "'that the government prove "continuity plus rela-
tionship" in order to show a pattern [of racketeering activity]'
[t]here is no reason why the same sort of assessment cannot be
made here.'17 3
Judge Ripple is correct that felony-murder and RICO issues
often involve line drawing. 7 4 However, such difficult line drawing
169. Id. at 913 (quoting United States v. Towne, 870 F.2d 880, 891 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1101 (1989)).
170. Id. at 915 (Ripple, J., dissenting).
171. Id. (Ripple, J., dissenting); cf. Lasko v. Owens, 881 F.2d 44, 63 n.4 (3d Cir.
1989) (Cowen, J., dissenting) ("The difficulty in determining where one crime begins and
another ends is illustrated in our recent decision in United States v. Balascak involv[ing]
an interpretation of the phrase 'three previous convictions' as used in the Armed Career
Criminal Act ").
172. Schienan, 894 F.2d at 915 (Ripple, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting
Sheckles v. State, 501 N.E.2d 1053, 1056 (Ind. 1986)).
173. Id. (Ripple, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Mus-
kovsky, 863 F.2d 1319, 1329 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1067 (1989)) (cita-
tions omitted).
174. A similar distinction is also made with multiple pleading. Multiple pleading is
the discouraged practice of charging the commission of a single offense in multiple counts.
In these instances, courts are required to determine when a crime is a single or multiple
offense. See, e.g., United States v. Allied Chem. Corp., 420 F Supp. 122, 123 (E.D. Va.
1976) (holding that defendant could be charged separately for each day it deposited chemi-
cal waste into a nearby waterway).
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was not intended under the ACCA. The legislative history indi-
cates that "ordinarily, the prior convictions would be established
by the federal prosecutor with certified court records. [And]
rarely, if ever, would a serious question arise concerning
these prior convictions. 116
The difficult and possibly arbitrary line drawing inherent in
the criminal episodes approach is entirely avoided under the inter-
vening convictions approach. No complicated evidentiary hearing
is needed to determine when one occasion ends and another be-
gins.176 The only evidence necessary to enhance a defendant's sen-
tence is the prior charging instruments. The court will simply
"compare the dates of the convictions with the dates of the crimes.
This is a much less cumbersome procedure than taking evidence
and evaluating the precise temporal, spatial, or jurisprudential re-
lationship between two crimes.' This less awkward procedure is
especially appealing considering that federal courts are already
overwhelmed with criminal trials. 1 8
3. The Proposed Clarification
Congress should enact the intervening convictions approach.
The amendment could be simple and straightforward. Congress
should simply replace the language "committed on occasions dif-
ferent from one another" with "and each of the three previous
convictions preceded the commission of the next crime for which
175. S. REP. No. 585, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1982).
176. It is not suggested that evidentiary hearings were not contemplated by Con-
gress. See S. REP. No. 190, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 12 (1983) (explaining that the first stage
of a two part procedure would involve an evidentiary hearing regarding the two prior con-
victions); S. REP. No. 585, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1982)'(explaining that the subsequent
proceedings regarding prior convictions "would be in the nature of an evidentiary
hearing.").
177. United States v. Balascsak, 873 F.2d 673, 684 (3d Cir. 1989) (en banc), affd,
902 F.2d 1558 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 173 (1990).
178. See, e.g., Armed Career Criminal Act, Hearing on H.R. 1627 and S. 52 Before
the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 126
(1984) ("Our courts are overloaded. We are concerned now about talang care of the litiga-
tion that we have, particularly when you see the nightmare that our Federal courts
have because of the tremendous criminal load that they are carrying right now." (state-
ment of Representative Shaw)). Given the benefits of the intervening convictions approach,
if Congress does want to apply the ACCA to those criminals whose sentences will not be
enhanced through an intervemng convictions approach, it should amend the ACCA by im-
plementing an intervening convictions approach mechanism, while reducing the number of
required predicate convictions to two. Such an amendment would provide courts with an
effective standard.
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conviction could be considered." The proposed clarification would
amend the ACCA to read:
In the case of a person who violates section 922(g) of this title
and has three previous convictions by any court referred to in
section 922(g)(1) of this title for a violent felony or a serious
drug offense or both, [and each of the three previous convictions
preceded the commission of the next crime for which conviction
could be considered], such person shall be fined not more than
$25,000 and imprisoned not less than fifteen years, and notwith-
standing any other provision of law, the court shall not suspend
the sentence of, or grant a probationary sentence to, such person
with respect to the conviction under section 922(g) and such
person shall not be eligible for parole with respect to the sen-
tence imposed under this subsection. 179
In addition, Congress should include appropriate legislative
history The original ACCA contained no legislative history relat-
ing specifically to the three previous convictions requirement issue,
nor did the 1988 amendment. With appropriate legislative history,
courts would not have to speculate as to the proper interpretation.
The legislative history should briefly describe the confusion
surrounding the three previous convictions requirement to demon-
strate congressional awareness of the problem. It should also con-
tain a blanket statement that, "Congress rejects the 'criminal epi-
sodes' approach in favor of the 'intervening convictions' approach
articulated in United States v Balascsak." New statutory lan-
guage, in conjunction with thorough legislative history, finally
would eliminate the ambiguity surrounding the three previous
convictions requirement by firmly establishing the intervening
convictions approach.
CONCLUSION
Congress has attempted to remove career criminals from soci-
ety, yet the ambiguities of legislation have hindered progress. The
three previous convictions requirement of the ACCA presents one
such ambiguity Until Congress clarifies its intent, courts should
apply the intervening convictions approach. The statutory lan-
guage is sufficiently vague to permit courts to examine the appro-
priate legislative history, which supports adoption of this
approach.
179. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (1988).
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Furthermore, Congress should address this issue. By specifi-
cally adopting the intervening convictions approach, Congress
would protect the Act's original purpose of incarcerating the ca-
reer criminal, more accurately identify career criminals, and im-
pose a less arduous task on courts seeking to apply the ACCA.
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